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Background: In many countries, NMAs, along with other stakeholders, play a part in the regulation of physicians.
The purpose of this paper is to compare and explain the level of involvement of NMAs in physician regulation in
several developed countries, with a specific emphasis on Israel.
Methods: The authors conducted a review of the literature on physician regulation, focusing on licensing and
registration, postgraduate training and physician disciplinary measures. Detailed country specific information was
also obtained via the websites of relevant NMAs and regulatory bodies and correspondence with select NMAs.
Five test cases were examined in detail: Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United
States. The Israeli case will be discussed at greater length.
Results: Medical licensing usually lies in the hands of the government (on the national or state level). Specialist
training, on the other hand, is often self-regulated and entrusted in the hands of the profession, frequently under
the direct responsibility of the NMA, as in Israel, the Netherlands and Germany.
In all the countries presented, other than Germany, the NMA is not involved in instituting disciplinary procedures in
cases of alleged physician misconduct.
Discussion: The extent to which NMAs fulfill regulatory functions varies greatly from country to country. The
relationship between government and the profession in the area of regulation often parallels the dominant mode
of governance in the health care system as a whole. Specifically, the level of involvement of the Israeli Medical
Association in medical regulation is a result of political, historical and ideological arrangements shaped vis-à-vis the
government over the years.
Conclusions: In Continental Europe, co-operation between the NMA and the government is more common than
in the USA and the UK. The Israeli regulatory model emerged in a European-like fashion, closer to the Netherlands
than to Germany.
The Israeli case, as well as the others, demonstrates the importance of history and ideology in shaping
contemporary regulatory models.* Correspondence: malkeb@ima.org.il
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According to the saying, “there is power in numbers”,
and nowhere is this more true than in the case of profes-
sional associations. What an individual might not be able
to achieve, can often be actualized as part of a larger
group. Therefore, in a large number of developed and
developing countries throughout the world, physicians
are organized and/or represented by national medical
associations (NMAs).
The role of the NMA is multi-faceted. It may serve
as a trade union, professional standards setter, policy
maker, ethical arbiter, disciplinarian, or some combin-
ation of the above. Certain functions may be statutory,
most are not. Although the precise function of the med-
ical association may vary from country to country, there
are certain functions that are prevalent in many asso-
ciations, among them: regulation, quality assurance,
CME, ethics and public health policy.
With the development and expansion of the medical
world and all that encompasses from an economic, ethical,
statutory and policy point of view, most NMAs no longer
view themselves solely as trade unions. Some do not see
themselves as fulfilling that role at all. In a post by former
American Medical Association (AMA) president Peter
Carmel, he writes that the British Medical Association
(BMA) “calls itself ‘the independent trade union and pro-
fessional association for doctors and medical students.’
Note the initial emphasis on trade union-certainly some-
thing the AMA is not [1].” (emphasis in the original)
Even where NMAs do fulfill the traditional role of trade
union, their ambit today reaches much further. We set out
to explore the key areas in which NMAs are involved.
What regulatory functions do they assume? To what ex-
tent do they oversee the clinical and quality aspects of the
profession? How much are they involved in local or na-
tional decision making? And what is the division of re-
sponsibility between the profession and the government?
This article focuses on the regulatory functions of
NMAs and the balance of power with government in
these areas. As these functions have traditionally rested
more in the hands of the profession, we have begun here
and in further articles will explore NMAs’ involvement in
quality improvement and public policy, which in our view
are later additions to the definition of professional activity.
Five test cases were examined in detail, describing the
actions of the main institutions and organizations in vari-
ous countries. The Israeli case, which is rarely mentioned
in the literature, will be discussed at greater length.
Regulation and NMAs
The term regulation can be used in many ways and is
difficult to define.
The literature on regulation emphasizes the workings,
characteristics, failures and merits of regulation throughthe workings of administrative agencies. These aspects
are expressed in one of the most widely cited definitions
of regulation, namely as “sustained and focused control
exercised by a public agency over activities that are
valued by the community” [2-4].
Following Levi-Faur and other scholars, this definition
can be extended to include not only public agencies, but
also business-to-business regulation or civil regulation.
This extended definition emphasizes the role of diverse
sets of actors and can be used in many fields of policy,
including health care. In particular, it allows us to
recognize non-governmental entities such as non-profit
organizations, associations and labor unions. For pur-
poses of this paper, we shall apply this definition to the
field of physician regulation, and examine how adminis-
trative agencies monitor traditional tasks of physicians’
professional life. This regulatory action can be broken
down into several subsections, including training, licens-
ing and discipline. We shall closely examine the involve-
ment of the NMA in each of the three fields of activity
in several countries.
The role of NMAs in training, licensing and disciplin-
ary functions is a complex one. Physicians have long
insisted on self-regulation, believing that the complexity
of the profession would make regulation by non-
professionals ineffective [5]. “From a physician stand-
point, it would not be advantageous to have their actions
or clinical decisions evaluated by laypeople and members
of the public who are not likely to have the necessary
training or experience to make those judgments [6].”
However, over the years concerns have been raised by
the public about trust, transparency, accountability and
potential conflicts of interest on the part of physicians
[5]. This has led to a shift from viewing self-regulation
as a right, to viewing it as a privilege that needs to be
fair and transparent in order to earn the public’s trust.
This tension between the legitimate needs of both
sides – the public and the experts - is not exclusive to
medicine. An ongoing international debate has been tak-
ing place in recent years regarding the nature of regula-
tion in the fields of finance, energy, transportation etc. A
single, uniformly acceptable regulatory model cannot
be found. On the spectrum between no regulation and
complete statutory regulation, different models arise,
most conspicuously self regulation [7]. This diversity is
evident also in the field of physician regulation, where
the range and volume of responsibilities assumed by
NMAs differs widely, reflecting different modes of gov-
ernance of national health care systems.
Theoretical framework
Various sources claim that the history, tradition and par-
ticular practices that have developed in each country
greatly influence the relationship between the state and
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sional autonomy and the profession’s involvement in
regulation [8-11]. These differences pose difficulty in
finding a common denominator that would allow for
greater generalization among the different countries.
Arguably, functions, roles and fields of responsibility of
organizations and institutions are heavily influenced by
their political and administrative environment. Saltman,
for instance, points to context and culture (themselves
shaped by historical, demographic, geographic and polit-
ical circumstances) as deciding factors in the development
of health systems. Even issues such as management, deci-
sion making, responsibility and organization of the health
system are heavily influenced by these factors [9]. The way
NMAs operate similarly reflects the nature, principles and
dynamics of their surrounding health care system.
The use of typologies is common in comparative polit-
ical research in order to frame the institutional context in
which policies are developed and applied. Categorization
of countries into different clusters according to distinct
cultural, historical and organizational attributes of their
public systems, has been developed extensively in recent
decades, and has served as a useful tool in the hands of
researchers aiming to identify, analyze and explicate the
logic of policy making and political behavior [12]. A prom-
inent example is Esping-Andersen’s seminal work, in
which he distinguishes between three types of welfare
regimes in developed countries (liberal, conservative
and social-democratic) according to the extent of social
entitlements and the individual’s degree of independence
from market forces [13]. Similar works in the field of
health care and later examinations of Esping-Andersen’s
typology paved the way to newer classifications, which
differentiated the health care system from other domains
of the welfare state. Over the course of time, a widely
accepted typology of health care systems has evolved,
composed of three major models [12,14-17]:
– The National Health Service (or Beveridge) model -
characterized by universal coverage, funding from
general taxation, and public ownership and/or
control of health care delivery. This model is most
identified with the UK, as well as Sweden and New
Zealand, although all three countries, to varying
degrees, have moved away from its pure form.
– The social insurance (or Bismarckian) model -
compulsory and universal coverage as part of a
system of social security. Health care is financed by
employer and employee contributions, through non-
profit insurance funds, and the provision of health
care is through public or private ownership.
Germany is a prominent example of this model.
– The private insurance model - an employer based or
individual purchase of private health insurance.Health care is funded by individual and/or employer
contributions and health delivery is predominantly
under private ownership. This type is most clearly
represented by the US.
As mentioned by Burau and Blank, this typology is
characterized by a strong economic orientation that, at
least to some extent, marginalizes the social and political
dimensions of health care systems. In order to counter-
act this, other works have introduced new attributes to
the definition of health care systems, emphasizing their
institutional features [12]. Moran’s work is particularly
relevant for our purpose, as he sets out to better account
for the institutional characteristics of health care. Moran
argues that the emphasis on organizational aspects of
health care such as finance and provision captures only
one aspect of health care and misses out on other im-
portant dimensions. Accordingly, he shifts the focus of
analysis from the organization to the governance of
health care, i.e., from the economic point of view to the
political one: who governs what, and how. Specifically,
his analysis relates to the governance of consumption
(resource allocation and access to health care services),
provision (regulation of hospitals and physicians) and
production (regulation of medical innovations) [18,19].
Relying on an institutional-oriented analysis, Moran
constructed a model of different types of health care
states, which resembles the triangular Beveridge-Bismarck
-private insurance model, but emphasizes the political ra-
ther than organizational dimensions of governance. Three
types appearing in the model are especially relevant for
our thesis [18]:
– Entrenched command and control health care state –
provides extensive public access based on citizenship
and extensive control of resource allocation through
administrative mechanisms, giving the state a central
role in governing the consumption of health care,
including hospitals and doctors.
– Corporatist health care state – gives greater power
to various actors within the health system, as
opposed to concentrating power in a central source.
This gives statutory bodies such as non-profit
insurance funds an important role and limits public
control over health care costs. Similarly, the
governance of doctors and hospitals is less
centralized and they therefore play an important
role in the governance of provision.
– Market health care state – limits public access to
health care. Private hospitals and doctors dominate
and remain relatively unchecked.
According to Moran, the governance of doctors is a
key factor in our understanding of health care systems,
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lation of physician’s conduct. Moran details the historical
power struggle between the state and the profession over
control on the General Medical Council (GMC), one of
the central entities of medical regulation in the UK, a
struggle that concluded with the “invasion” of state
agencies into the traditional self-regulated realm of the
medical profession and the resultant weakening of phys-
ician autonomy [18].
While the UK is considered a “state centered system”,
Germany is a clear example of a corporatist model. In
point of fact, the corporatist model guides not only the
health care system but also political and economic life in
Germany. It is defined by the sharing of decision-making
powers among the government, labor unions and em-
ployers’ organizations. A deciding factor in corporatism
is the delegation of specific governmental rights or activ-
ities as provided for by law to other, self-regulating
institutions. Within the health care system, physicians’
associations (chambers) are obligated by law to provide
health services as defined by the legislature. In turn, the
associations and their members have a monopoly over
the ambulatory care market– the most prestigious and
the most lucrative part of the German health care sys-
tem [18,20].
The US on the other hand is a classic example of a
market-driven health system. Moran refers to the rise of
managed care and the commercialization of hospitals
and health maintenance organizations (HMOs) during
the 1990s as leading forces in the shift to a corporate
health care system. The growing corporatization of
medicine involves a fundamental change in market ar-
rangements as the rate of solo practitioners sharply
declines and the cornerstone of physician economic au-
tonomy– fee for service - erodes accordingly [18].
Moran contributed significantly to the development of
health care typology by stressing the political dimension
of governance. With regard to medical regulation, he
describes the dynamics and the balance of power be-
tween the state, the physicians and the market, justifiably
concentrating on financial arrangements and control
over key regulatory institutions. However, the role of
NMAs in the regulation of doctors receives only little
attention.
Hypotheses
Whereas Moran and others focus on the political and
economic struggle between the medical profession and
the state, we wish to concentrate on the regulatory role
played by NMAs. Using governance-oriented classifica-
tion of health care systems as our theoretical framework,
we wish to offer a possible explanation for the variance
in the extent of regulatory tasks under NMA responsi-
bility. In order to do so we shall formulate three possiblehypotheses regarding the volume of regulatory tasks
carried out by NMAs:
1. A deciding factor in corporatism is the delegation of
specific governmental rights or activities provided for
by law to other, self-regulating institutions. It seems
reasonable to expect that in a corporatist model the
NMA will be more involved in the routine regulation
of physicians than will NMAs in an entrenched
command and control health care system, a market
health care system or a hybrid model.
2. Following the logic of the preceding assumption, we
expect to find that the volume of regulatory tasks
carried out by an NMA in a mixed model (of
corporatist and one or more additional models) will
be lower than the volume of tasks carried out in a
solely corporatist model, but higher than in the
entrenched command and control health care model
or the market health care model.
3. We expect to find little or no difference at all
between the entrenched command and control
health care model and the market health care model
regarding the volume of regulatory tasks carried out
by NMAs. In both cases, bodies other than
physicians’ associations (the state and the market,
respectively) are the key actors in regulating health
systems, dominating their financial and
organizational aspects (i.e. control of resource
allocation and public access to health care).
Therefore in these cases NMAs are not expected to
be extensively involved in physician regulation.
Methods and case selection
The authors conducted a review of the literature on
physician regulation, focusing on the areas of licensing
and registration, postgraduate training and specialist cer-
tification and physician disciplinary measures. These
aspects of medical regulation shall be used in order to
examine the scope of involvement of NMAs in medical
regulation. We assigned a number between zero and
three to each NMA, which reflects the aggregate num-
ber of activities led by the NMA. The higher the num-
ber, the greater that NMA’s involvement is in physician
regulation.
Publications of the World Health Organization Regional
Office for Europe and the European Observatory on
Health Systems and Policies served as main sources of in-
formation regarding medical regulatory mechanisms in
different countries. We obtained additional data from
journal articles and expert reviews, which were found
through the use of search engines such as PubMed and
Google-scholar. Key words used: medical associations,
professionalism, self-regulation, medical regulation, licens-
ing, registration, specialist training, certification, licensure,
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latory mechanisms in Israel was conducted in Hebrew.
More detailed country specific information was also
obtained via the websites of relevant NMAs and regula-
tory bodies as well as correspondence with select NMAs.
A further five test cases were examined in detail, de-
scribing the actions of the main institutions and
organizations in the following countries: Germany, Israel,
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United
States. The Israeli case, which is rarely mentioned in the
literature, will be discussed at greater length.
The logic of case selection is based on our theoretical
framework. As explained, the USA, the UK and Germany
are often described in health policy literature as the
archetypes of three different health care regimes. The dif-
ference in their method of governance constitutes a po-
tential explanation of the variance in regulatory activity of
their NMAs. In contrast, the Dutch health care system is
considered a hybrid case, combining both corporatist and
state-like elements of governance, and therefore cannot be
exclusively categorized to either model [12]. In addition,
the Dutch bureaucratic system tends to be less legalistic
and more inclined to incorporate pluralistic elements than
the German bureaucracy, moving it a little closer to the
liberal type of regime. It is also interesting to note that
Esping-Andersen himself has labeled the Dutch welfare
state “The Dutch Enigma” and stated that “In any case,
the Netherlands remains a Janus-headed welfare regime,
combining both social-democratic and conservative
attributes” [21].
In our opinion, this set of cases creates a sound base
for comparison which in turn will set the stage for a se-
quential discussion regarding our fifth and somewhat
academically neglected case, Israel.
Findings
The findings are organized into three sections. Each sec-
tion covers a major regulatory task: licensing and regis-
tration; postgraduate training and specialist certification;
physician disciplinary measures.
We begin each section with a general description of
the specific task and then move on to examine the div-
ision of responsibilities between the profession and the
government in the five countries mentioned above. We
end each section with a summary of the findings from
the reviewed countries.
Licensing and registration
The licensing and registration of physicians is imperative
to ensure that only suitably trained and qualified
professionals are able to practice medicine.a In many
countries, the responsibility for physician licensing
belongs to the Ministry of Health. In contrast, there are
only a small number of cases where this responsibilitylies with an independent professional organization.
Often, however, even where the responsibility lies with
the Ministry of Health, there is a role for the medical
profession to play as well [22].
In many countries where the medical license is issued
by the Ministry of Health, it is issued only following
mandatory registration or membership with an inde-
pendent professional body. Such membership can be a
precondition, imposed by law, for authorization to prac-
tice medicine. These professional bodies hold the re-
sponsibility to maintain a register of licensed physicians
in their country.
There are also several countries where physician licens-
ing is the direct or delegated responsibility of an inde-
pendent professional body, such as Austria, France,
Ireland, Latvia and the United Kingdom. In Austria, the
Austrian Medical Chamber (Österreichische Ärztekammer)
was delegated the responsibility for licensing and regula-
tion of physicians by the Ministry of Health, and is ac-
countable to the Minister of Health with regards to
granting, amending and withdrawing medical licenses.
Similarly, in France, the Minister of Health delegates phys-
ician licensing to the professional body: the Ordre des
Médecins. Medical professionals are required to register
with the Ordre des Médecins in order to receive
authorization to practice.
In other countries, physician licensing is the responsibil-
ity of a combination of government, professional and inde-
pendent bodies. In Spain, the licensing of physicians is
carried out by the Ministry of Education and Science and
registration is the responsibility of the Consejo General de
Colegios Médicos (Spanish Medical Association) and the
Provincial Councils of the Medical College. Registration
with the Medical College is a legal pre-condition to the
practice of medicine [22].
There are also differences among countries with
regards to the division of responsibility within the coun-
try. In some cases, licensing and registration responsibil-
ities lie with a national body, whereas in countries such
as the United States and Germany, they are split among
the different states.
Germany
In Germany, medical students undergo more than six
years of undergraduate medical education, during which
they are required to complete two State licensing
examinations and a practical year. The practical year
concludes with the second state licensing exam.
The Medical Licensure Act (Approbationsordnung),
introduced by the Federal Ministry of Health (BMG)
in 2003, specifies the education and licensing re-
quirements for doctors in the country, while the 1961
Medical Practitioner’s Act (Bundesärzteordnung) is the
national law for practicing physicians. These two acts
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Germany [22,23].
Medical licensing is the responsibility of the Minister of
Health of the individual state (Lander). The license to
practice, issued for an indefinite period following success-
ful completion of the licensing examination, is recognized
throughout the country. Reaccreditation or re-licensing is
not an official requirement in Germany. Nevertheless the
regulation of the State Medical Associations instills a duty
on all physicians to complete continued medical educa-
tion. Furthermore, if doctors do not complete sufficient
amounts of CME, they face reduced reimbursement and
the withdrawal of their license [24].
Upon receiving the license to practice medicine, doctors
must also be registered to practice with the Ärztekammer
(State Chamber of Physicians) of the Lander in which they
wish to work [22]. Physicians must become members of
their local chamber of physicians and pay an annual mem-
bership fee, which varies in correlation with their earnings.
The State Chambers maintain up-to-date registers of their
members, with details of their employment and contact
information. The German Medical Association (GMA) is
the umbrella organization, made up of the 17 State
Chambers of Physicians.b
Israel
In Israel, under the 1976 Physicians’ Ordinance, the
Ministry of Health is the body responsible for granting
the general medical license. After completing 6 years of
medical school, graduates must complete a 12 month
internship, following which they receive a medical dip-
loma and may then apply for a permanent medical li-
cense through the Division of Medical Professions at
the Ministry of Health [25]. Israel does not have
mandatory re-licensure or re-registration. Physicians
who study in Israel are not required to take a licensing
exam, as opposed to most foreign educated students.c
In addition to 6 years education plus an internship year
(and exam, where relevant) the law requires the
applicants to be an “upstanding human being” (usually
defined as having no criminal record), be an Israeli citi-
zen or permanent resident and have a basic command
of the Hebrew language. Registration with the Israeli
Medical Association (IMA) is not mandatory; neverthe-
less, the majority of publicly employed physicians are
members of the IMA.
The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, medical education consists of 6 years
undergraduate education. No internship is required for
initial registration of physicians, but a residency period is
included in specialist training [26]. According to the
Individual Healthcare Professions Act (BIG Act) only
practitioners who comply with the training and educationrequirements for their profession may be registered in the
BIG-register [27]. Registration is conducted through the
Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport, via the BIG-
register. The Royal Dutch Medical Association (KNMG) is
not involved in the initial registration and licensing of
physicians.
While there is no national licensing exam, there are
certain conditions doctors must meet before being
included in the BIG-register, among them [28]:
♦ They must hold a valid diploma
♦ They must be permitted to practice the profession
without restrictions
♦ They must pay the appropriate registration fee
♦ They must not have been placed under supervision
due to a psychological disorder
There are two types of medical licenses issued in the
Netherlands: a provisional license, whereby professionals
are permitted to work under supervision for a two year
period before obtaining full registration, and full regis-
tration, which allows independent practice for an indef-
inite period, subject to re-accreditation [22].
Over 350,000 health professionals are registered on
the BIG-register, including: dentists, doctors, health
care psychologists, midwives, nurses, pharmacists,
physiotherapists and psychotherapists. The register
includes details of the health professionals’ education,
specialist training and any restrictions that have been
imposed upon them [27].
United Kingdom
Medical education in the UK is a 5 or 6 year undergradu-
ate degree, similar to Israel, Germany and the Netherlands
but as opposed to the US. Also like Israel and unlike the
US, the universities provide their own assessments of
graduates for licensing purposes, and there is no national
licensing exam.
As of 2009, doctors are required by law to both hold a
license to practice and to be registered in order to practice
medicine in the United Kingdom. The UK General Med-
ical Council (GMC) is appointed by Parliamentary Act
(Medical Act 1983) to conduct the regulation of the
medical profession, including licensing and registration
[29]. The GMC is a body independent both of the gov-
ernment and of domination by any single group, and is
publicly accountable. The Council has 24 members, 12
of whom are doctors and 12 of whom are lay members.
Physicians are automatically granted a license to prac-
tice upon registration. In order to receive full registra-
tion, physicians must submit a Certificate of Experience
(completed by their medical school) attesting that their
year as an intern was successfully completed. The li-
cense to practice is issued for an indefinite period, but
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ation [30]. The BMA is not involved in the licensing and
registration process of doctors in the UK.
United States
U.S. medical students undergo four years of postgradu-
ate education, after taking a set of prerequisite courses
during their undergraduate years. Upon completion,
they perform a one year internship, which is the mini-
mum training requirement for obtaining a general li-
cense to practice medicine in most states. In order to
obtain a medical license, applicants must present proof
of their education and training, details of their work his-
tory, and pass a medical licensing examination. In
addition, they must provide information about their
medical history, as well as any arrests and convictions,
to their State Medical Board [31].
Each state is responsible for the key functions of
physician licensing through its State Medical Board, a
statutory agency provided for in the state’s Medical
Practice Act.
The governance of State Medical Boards differs
across the country. Some boards are independent bod-
ies, and hold all licensing and disciplinary powers.
Others operate under a larger umbrella organization
such as the Department of Health, and have mixed
levels of responsibilities and often an advisory capacity.
State Medical Boards are typically made up of physician
and non-physician members appointed by the state
governor [32].
Doctors may practice in several states, but they must
be licensed in each state in which they work. In addition,
most states require physicians to periodically re-register
after obtaining their initial license.
The Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB), a
non-profit organization, brings some uniformity to the
licensing process for the different states. Together with
the National Boards of Medical Examiners, the FSMB
created and currently administers the United States
Medical Licensing Examination. It also provides a Feder-
ation Credentials Verification Service which provides
verified records of a physician’s core medical credentials
[32]. The AMA plays no role in the licensing or registra-
tion process.
Summary-licensing and registration
In both Germany and the United States, medical licens-
ing is the responsibility of the different states as opposed
to a national body. In Germany, the general medical li-
cense is issued by the State Minister of Health; however,
physicians must also be registered with their State
Chamber, which is the professional body and part of the
GMA. In contrast, in the United States, each State
Medical Board is organized differently. Some may beindependent bodies, while others are under the control
of the Department of Health. The United Kingdom has a
system different from the others, with the GMC, an in-
dependent body made up of both health professionals
and lay persons, holding responsibility for physician
licensing.
The situation in the Netherlands is most similar to
that of Israel. In both countries the government is re-
sponsible for administering the general medical license
(Table 1).
Postgraduate training and specialist certification
Postgraduate medical training is a complex process, and
the medical profession places great importance on self-
education and assessment, in a way that is transparent
and acceptable to the public.
Educational standards and curriculum setting are an in-
tegral part of both undergraduate and postgraduate med-
ical education. In some countries the same organization is
involved in both of these stages, while in many other
countries these roles are separated. Additionally, many
countries have bodies that oversee and accredit continuing
medical education (CME) initiatives to help ensure that
practicing physicians have access to educational resources
throughout their careers.
The European Union of Medical Specialties (UEMS)
Charter on Training of Medical Specialists in the Euro-
pean Community states that:
“At a national level, the training of medical specialists
is regulated by a National Authority, which can be a
combination of competent professional or university
organizations, a national board or a national
governmental authority advised by a professional
authority [33].”
Germany
The German Federal Ministry of Health is responsible
for setting uniform standards for undergraduate medical
education in the country. Medical education is funded
by the respective state governments, which also maintain
the medical schools and university hospitals.
Postgraduate training of doctors has been delegated
to the medical profession at state level. The German
State Chambers of Physicians (Arztekammern) are re-
sponsible for post-graduate medical training including
specialist training, examinations and certification. The
Chambers set training standards and administer oral
exams. Regulations on the content and design of spe-
cialty training are incorporated in state by-laws and the
independent statutes of the Chambers. In order to en-
sure standardization within the country, the GMA has
developed federal model training regulations which are
followed closely by the individual chambers in their
Table 1 Licensing and registration
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make it mandatory for doctors to hold a specialist degree
before they can set up practice within the public health in-
surance system [23]. Specialty training in Germany usually
lasts between 4-6 years, depending on the field [22,23].Israel
Israeli medical schools grant the degree of Doctor of
Medicine (MD) after six years of study, together with
the completion of one year’s rotating internship and the
submission of a scientific thesis [34].
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Medical specialization is the jurisdiction of the profes-
sion, with the Scientific Council of the Israeli Medical
Association (IMA) holding statutory responsibility for
both training and specialization procedures of medical
specialists, as well as the accreditation of departments
for specialty training.
The length of basic post-graduate training in Israel
varies from 4 to 7 years, depending on the specialty.
Exams are administered in two stages-a stage 1 written
exam halfway through training and a stage 2 oral exam
during or after the last year of residency.
The Netherlands
The Royal Dutch Medical Association (KNMG) regulates
the training and specialist certification of physicians. The
KNMG determines the content of training for medical
specialists, the accreditation of training institutes, and the
requirements for re-registration of medical specialists [35]
via “colleges”, which are regulatory bodies belonging to
the KNMG. The rules of the colleges require approval of
the Dutch Minister of Health [36].
Specialist training in the Netherlands requires physicians
to work as medical residents (doctors in training) in a clin-
ical setting. Residents must be enrolled in the training
register of one of three KNMG committees, depending on
the field. Training times range from 2-1/2 to 4 years for
public health specialists, 3 years for general practitioners
and 4-6 years for medical specialists [37].
In order to be registered as a medical specialist,
physicians must be registered in the BIG-register as well
as one of the training committee, hold an employment
contract for the duration of the training and follow a
training schedule that corresponds with the training of
the college [26].
United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, by order of the Medical Act
(1983), the GMC regulates all stages of physician
training. The GMC is responsible for overseeing the core
medical curriculum at the undergraduate level. In April
2010 they began regulating postgraduate training as well,
due to a merger between the GMC and the Postgraduate
Medical Education and Training Board (PMETB), the
body previously responsible for such training [38].
Upon graduation, medical students enter a Foundation
Programme, a two-year training program designed to give
trainees a range of general experience before choosing an
area of medicine in which to specialize. Subsequently they
choose to train for a further three years to become a GP,
or longer, to become a specialist consultant.
When a doctor has completed and gained the required
skills and competencies, he or she is awarded a Certificate
of Completion of Training (CCT), which allows regis-tration on the Specialist or GP Register, a necessary
requirement for practice as a consultant or general practi-
tioner. Prior to registration, the GMC checks that the doc-
tor in question holds the appropriate qualifications and
has passed the necessary examinations [30].
United States
The ABMS is a national, non-governmental, self-regulatory
organization, comprising the 24 medical specialty member
boards, and is the preeminent body responsible for the cre-
dentialing of medical specialists in the United States.
Following receipt of a medical degree from an accredited
US institution, candidates must undertake three to six
years of training in an accredited residency and pass an
examination in order to achieve initial specialty certifica-
tion. The specialist evaluation is a rigorous process involv-
ing acknowledgement of educational requirements, pro-
fessional peer evaluation and examination.
US specialty boards are jointly approved by the American
Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS) and the American
Medical Association Council on Medical Education (AMA/
CME) [39].
Summary-postgraduate training and specialist
certification
A common finding in the five test cases is that medical
education, and especially specialist training, is often self-
regulated and entrusted in the hands of the profession.
In Israel, the Netherlands and Germany specialist train-
ing is the direct responsibility of the NMA; the IMA
Scientific Council regulates this process in Israel, the
State Chambers of Physicians and the GMA hold the re-
sponsibility in Germany and the KNMG controls spe-
cialist training in the Netherlands. In the United
Kingdom, the GMC, an independent body, took control
of post-graduate training in 2010 and in the United
States, the self-regulatory body of the American Board
of Medical Specialists is responsible for the credentialing
of medical specialists (Table 2).
Physician disciplinary measures
Physicians are answerable to multiple layers of account-
ability, from professionally led regulation to hospital
bylaws and regulation by health authorities. Professional
self-regulation requires physicians to have an internal
mechanism for receiving, investigating and dealing with
complaints and allegations of professional misconduct or
negligence.
Many health care experts believe that physicians, with
their extensive educational background and medical
knowledge following years of training and clinical ex-
perience, are best placed to judge their peers. However,
it has also been argued that self-regulation can be self-
serving and physicians may want to “protect their own”,
Table 2 Specialty training








Responsibility of the NMA
(State chambers), accountable
to the Governments of the
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Oral exam at the end
of specialist training
4-6 years, depending on the
specialty
Training and examination
standards are set by the
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specialty
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content of the training for
medical specialists,
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begins with a two-year
Foundation training
programme. Trainees then
choose to train for an
additional 3 year to become a
GP or longer to become a
specialist consultant.
The GMC sets the standards,
learning objectives and
requirements for postgraduate
medical education in the UK.
US
Most states have their
own Medical Practice
Act.
Responsibility of the American
Board of Medical Specialties
(ABMS)
Physicians must pass an
examination in order to
receive initial specialty
certification
3-6 years of training The ABMS is the preeminent
body responsible for the
credentialing of medical
specialists. US specialty boards
are jointly approved by the
ABMS and the American
Medical Association Council on
Medical Education (AMA/CME).
Borow et al. Israel Journal of Health Policy Research 2013, 2:8 Page 10 of 19
http://www.ijhpr.org/content/2/1/8and not appropriately reprimand their fellow physicians.
For this reason, in many countries, medical disciplinary
boards are composed of both medical professionals and
lay persons. In almost all cases, public members make
up a minority of the total membership of the regulatory
bodies. The vast majority of representative medical
associations support and encourage the concept of self-
regulation of the medical profession [6].Germany
There are two possible disciplinary procedures in place
in Germany - one under the professional code
(Berufsrechtliches Verfahren) and the other under fed-
eral licensing law. In addition, in cases of treatment
errors, patients can appeal to the arbitration board ofthe competent State Chamber of Physicians or sue a
physician in civil court.
The GMA does not investigate or consider complaints.
However, the professional codes of the State Chambers
of Physicians are legally binding and define the rules of
good conduct and duties of physicians. In case of an
alleged breach of the professional code of conduct, the
State Chamber may undertake procedures under the
professional law.
In cases of minor breach of the professional code, the
State Chamber of Physicians may issue a warning, which
could also include a monetary fine, in accordance with
the level of infringement. In the case of a serious breach,
the Chambers may open proceedings at the official
Court of Professional Conduct. If a physician is found
guilty, there are several sanctions which can be applied,
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alties. The most severe sanction the Chamber may issue
is a statement of unreliability or unworthiness of the
physician, which usually results in the withdrawal of his
or her license [40].
Disciplinary procedures under federal licensing re-
gulations fall under the competence of the government
rather than the State Chambers of Physicians. The li-
cense to practice medicine is issued, and may therefore
only be withdrawn, by the competent state health au-
thorities of the federal states. If a physician has been
found guilty of behavior that labels him unworthy or
unreliable, his license will be revoked. The license may
be suspended while a criminal investigation is ongoing
and the physician will not be allowed to practise.
Physicians may appeal against the decision to withdraw
a license in the lower and higher administrative courts
[23,40].
Israel
Disciplinary measures for negligent, unethical or un-
lawful behavior in Israel fall under the auspices of the
Ministry of Health. In addition, breaches of the IMA
Ethical Code may subject a physician to sanctions by
the IMA Ethics Committee, including a warning, re-
buke or expulsion from the organization.
The Physicians’ Ordinance gives the Health Minister
authority to suspend or cancel a physicians’ license, or
alternatively, to issue a warning or censure, for various
reasons, including serious medical incompetence or neg-
ligence. In addition, the National Health Insurance Law
mandates the Minister to appoint an ombudsman to re-
ceive complaints from citizens on a range of administra-
tive or clinical matters in the health system (Health
plans and hospitals have individual ombudsmen) [34].
Besides the above, the Patients’ Rights Act of 1996
legislates the establishment of “examination committees”
whose purpose is to examine specific adverse events that
occur in medical institutions, including hospitals and
ambulatory clinics. These committees can be convened
by the head of the institution and/or the Director Gen-
eral of the Ministry of Health, upon receipt of a com-
plaint by a patient or to look into an adverse event. The
findings could potentially serve as the basis for disciplin-
ary proceedings against a physician.
The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, the BIG Act covers disciplinary rules
for all health professionals. Disciplinary proceedings
following complaints by patients or other parties are
performed by independent judicial courts. These courts,
known as tuchtcolleges, consist of two lawyers and three
members of the medical profession; the latter are
nominated by the KNMG [36]. The Central College inThe Hague hears appeals and is made up of two medical
and three legal professionals [28].
Various sanctions may be issued by the tuchtcolleges,
including deletion from the BIG medical register; sus-
pension from the register for a maximum of one year;
probationary suspension of up to two years; restrictive
entitlement to practice either for a limited period or for
life; or a monetary fine [28].
In addition to the public disciplinary procedure, as
contained in the BIG Act, there are also internal discip-
linary procedures operated by the KNMG. The KNMG
code of conduct provides guidance for physicians’
actions, noting the ethical and practical standards
for physicians practice. Physicians may report their
colleagues to the KNMG for breaches of the code.
According to the Rules of the KNMG disciplinary law,
the Council may impose the following measures: war-
ning; reprimand; denial or withdrawal to be a member
of the board, commission or any other college within the
KNMG for a period of up to five years; suspension of
membership of a professional association; suspension of
the individual KNMG membership for up to one year;
deletion from the membership of a professional associ-
ation or the individual KNMG membership [26].
United Kingdom
In cases of alleged professional misconduct by physicians
practicing in the UK, patients and medical professionals
are advised to submit complaints to the GMC. Where
serious misconduct is alleged, the GMC begins by inves-
tigating the case and deciding whether to refer it for ad-
judication. At the end of the investigation process, the
case is considered by two case examiners (senior GMC
staff ), one medical and one non-medical, who have the
authority to close the case without any action, issue a
warning to the doctor or refer the case to a Fitness to
Practice Panel.
At any time during the investigation, the GMC may
refer the doctor to an Interim Orders Panel. This panel
may suspend or restrict the doctor’s medical practice
while the investigation is in progress.
The adjudication process consists of a hearing and re-
ferral to a Fitness to Practice panel.d The Fitness to
Practice panel hears the allegations against the doctor,
determines whether they are substantiated and if so,
what sanctions, if any, are appropriate. The panel is
comprised of both medical and non-medical panelists
appointed by the Council. For individual cases, a panel
will usually consist of three to five members, one of
whom must be a medical professional and one of whom
must be non-medical, and a chairperson who may be
medical or non-medical.
If the panel concludes that the doctor’s fitness to prac-
tice is impaired, it has the authority to impose any of the
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the doctor provided the panel is satisfied that such
undertakings protect patients and the wider public inter-
est, place conditions on the doctor’s registration, sus-
pend the doctor’s registration or erase the doctor’s name
from the Medical Register, so that he/she can no longer
practice medicine [30].
The BMA as a trade union may represent a physician
in some types of disciplinary cases. However, they have
no involvement in instituting disciplinary proceedings
for physicians [41].
United States
The individual states in the US are primarily responsible
for dealing with complaints against physicians. Physician
disciplinary procedures are often included in individual
state medical acts. Following submission of a complaint,
State Medical Boards must investigate the matter and, if
necessary, evaluate a physician’s professional conduct
and his ability to practice medicine [28]. When disciplin-
ary sanctions are issued, the FSMB requires that the spe-
cific State Medical Board report these sanctions to a
wide range of bodies, including the Federation, state and
local medical societies, the AMA, the American Osteo-
pathic Association and the National Practitioner Data
Bank, as well as to certain government agencies [32].
Medical societies may discipline members for ethical
violations, with the maximum sanction being expulsion
from membership. Medical societies must also report
breaches to the relevant government body or state board
of medical examiners, providing any evidence of which
they are aware regarding alleged criminal conduct of a
physician in his or her medical practice. Any violation of
governmental law may result in the physician’s being
subject to civil or criminal liability [42].
Summary-Physician disciplinary measures
In all but one of the case studies, the NMA is not
involved in instituting disciplinary procedures for alleged
physician misconduct. The exception is Germany, where
there are two channels for disciplinary procedures: the
professional code (Berufsrechtliches Verfahren), overseen
by the State Chambers of Physicians, and federal licens-
ing law.
In Israel, disciplinary proceedings are primarily
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health. In the
Netherlands, they are performed by independent judi-
cial courts; however, these courts ensure the represen-
tation of the medical profession and participation of
the NMA and consist of two lawyers and three mem-
bers of the medical profession nominated by the
KNMG. The United Kingdom also ensures the partici-
pation of physicians in disciplinary procedures, as the
GMC is the independent regulator of physicians andadjudicates complaints of professional misconduct.
The BMA is not directly involved in this procedure,
but may represent a physician in some cases. The
AMA is also not officially involved in disciplinary
measures, which are regulated and administered by the
individual State Medical Boards in the US (Table 3).
Discussion
The findings indicate a wide variation in the extent of
regulatory functions fulfilled by NMAs, in each of the
three parameters discussed in this article. It appears that
there are great differences among some of the countries
studied, alongside similarities among others, as shown in
Table 4.
It seems that our findings strongly support all three
hypotheses presented. In Germany, a classic representa-
tive of the corporatist model, the medical chambers as-
sume the maximal number of regulatory tasks examined,
more than any other NMA, and Germany therefore
receives a score of three (hypothesis 1). The KNMG,
which operates in a hybrid health care system that
combines distinctive corporatist elements, assumes one
task out of three (specialist training). As suggested in hy-
pothesis 2, this is less involvement than that displayed
by its German counterpart and more than that of the
AMA and the BMA. Finally, both the AMA and BMA
(market and entrenched command and control model
respectively) assume no tasks at all, as suggested in hy-
pothesis 3.
Interestingly, in all the countries discussed, regardless
of the type of governance, specialty training is never
under the direct control of the government, and, alterna-
tively, there is significant involvement of the profession.
The exact reasons for this are unclear, but may be
related to the public desire for governmental supervision
of the most “basic” level of professionalism, along with
recognition of the expertise maintained by the profes-
sion, setting limits to governmental involvement in
“higher” levels of medical professionalism.
In Germany, as in other Continental European countries
such as Greece, Italy and Spain, a physician is required to
join his or her NMA in order to practice medicine. In
other countries, such as France and Austria, both registra-
tion and licensing is delegated to the NMA by the govern-
ment. As far as we know, no European country has ever
reversed the delegation of responsibility or taken it back
into its own hands [22].
Professional self-regulation is the norm also in the
Dutch health system [43]. In the Netherlands, regulatory
functions are divided between the government and the
KNMG, although the role of the KNMG is less signifi-
cant than the role of the GMA in Germany since the
KNMG has no standing as a chamber. It does, however,
have several functions of a chamber, particularly in the
Table 3 Disciplinary procedures





procedures: one under the
professional code
(Berufsrechtliches Verfahren)





In case of an alleged breach
of the professional code of
conduct, the State Chamber
may undertake procedures
under professional law.
The Chamber of Physicians
may issue a statement of
unreliability or unworthiness,
often resulting in competent
state health authorities
revoking the license to
practice.
Warning In case of an alleged breach
of the professional code of
conduct, the State Chamber
may undertake procedures
under the professional law.
ISRAEL
The Physicians’ Ordinance Government The IMA is not responsible
for disciplinary procedures;
however they do issue
certain sanctions for ethical
breaches.
The Ministry of Health may
suspend or cancel a
physician’s license.
Warning The IMA may issue sanctions
for breaches of the IMA
Ethical Code.
NETHERLANDS
The BIG Act Government Disciplinary proceedings are
performed by independent
judicial courts. These courts
(tuchtcolleges) consist of two
lawyers and three members
of the medical profession;
the latter are nominated by
the KNMG.
Deletion from the BIG





In the case of a breach of
the KNMG code of conduct
physicians may report their




The Medical Act (1983) GMC The BMA is not involved in
instituting disciplinary
proceedings for physicians,
although they may represent
them.
Suspension or removal from
the medical register.
Warning The GMC may issue
warnings to physicians
when their practice is not
in-keeping with the GMC’s
guidance on Good Medical
Practice.
US
State Medical Practice Acts State medical
board
When disciplinary sanctions
are issued, State Medical
Boards are required to report
these sanctions to a wide
range of bodies, including
the AMA.
Disciplinary proceedings
differ across states, however
in many cases State Medical








by excluding them from the
society. They must report
any breaches to the relevant
government body or state
board of medical examiners
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for the training of residents and the certification and
registration of specialists [22,28]. The body responsible
for these functions, known as the board of specialists,
was founded in 1961 and since that time has been under
the auspices of the KNMG, following a decade of
debates between the KNMG and the government as to
who would be responsible for such a body [43]. One
must note that alongside a long history of self-regulation,
the Dutch health system is also characterized by strong
government regulation whose main purpose is to control
health care costs (for example, strict monitoring of con-
struction of new hospitals and the volume of their activ-
ities) [35].
We might have expected the Netherlands to resemble
Germany more because of their geographical proximityand historical influences. After all, the Dutch health care
system evolved originally as a Bismarckian system, simi-
lar to other European countries. A possible explanation
for the difference in the standing of the KNMG and the
German medical organizations may be traced to external
historical developments.
Some have argued that the roots of modern represen-
tative medical associations date back to the formation of
European guilds in the 12th and 13th centuries, and cor-
poratism is merely a reincarnation of those guilds, with
control over training, specialization, experience and
therefore, the profession [6]. The Dutch guilds, for ex-
ample, were dissolved in 1798 by the government
established after the French Revolution. The KNMG was
established about 50 years later, in 1849. Conversely, in
large parts of Germany, the hold of the French was weak
Table 4 Summary
Country Mode of Governance Licensing and registration Specialty
training
Disciplinary procedures Score (Number of areas in
which NMA is involved)
Germany Corporatist Government-NMA NMA Government-NMA 3
Israel Hybrid (with
corporatist elements)
Government NMA Government 1
Netherlands Hybrid (with
corporatist elements)
Government NMA Government 1
UK Entrenched command
and control
GMC GMC GMC 0
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undisturbed for a long period after their counterparts in
the Netherlands were disbanded [10]. It is possible that
this may at least partially explain why professional med-
ical associations in Germany have a more “guild-like”
character than the KNMG, and in their modern form
even merited the status of a chamber.
In the United States market system, on the other hand,
the business sector holds a prominent place in the na-
tional economy. This might affect, even indirectly, the
greater involvement of private-public initiatives (usually by
non-profit organizations) in the health system, and the
collaboration between government and non-governmental
organizations. Stacey argues that in the American system,
as opposed to the German system, the State consciously
distances itself from interference with the economy, and
simultaneously distances other bodies, including profes-
sional associations, from similar intervention [8]. There-
fore, essential medical regulatory activities are carried out
by bodies such as the state medical boards, which on one
hand function on behalf of the states, but which essentially
have the standing of independent agencies within the
health system of each individual state. Similarly, the ABMS
is a non-profit organization unaffiliated with any govern-
mental sector, but also not an integral part of the AMA.
It is also worth mentioning that US physicians have
often viewed themselves as solo practitioners, not part of
any collective association. We can assume that this
strong sense of personal freedom possessed by American
doctors combined with the nature of the American
economy as a private business oriented system have
limited the role of the AMA as a regulatory body.
In the UK, where the government is responsible for
the provision and financing of health care services
through the NHS, the regulatory model differs from that
in the US or Germany. The BMA influences health pol-
icy in Britain, and is regarded by the government as a
serious partner in decision making. Nonetheless, the
BMA is defined as a trade union rather than a chamber.e
Although the Association represents physicians and
promotes their interests, the responsibility for regulatoryfunctions is delegated by the government to the GMC,
the body statutorily responsible for regulation and
quality assurance in medicine. The GMC, founded in
1858, represents a long tradition of state-sanctioned
professional-led regulation in the UK. This arrangement
served both the medical profession and the state in the
frame of a socio-political bargain; the physicians gained
professional autonomy (albeit not complete) in ex-
change for their obligation to act in the interest of the
public. Whereas the BMA’s prime purpose is to serve
the interest of the profession, the GMC clearly stems
from governmental decisions and statute [11,44]. More-
over, in recent years it seems that the state has
strengthened its control over the GMC, increasing the
number of lay members in the Council [45].
It seems that the connection between the involvement
of NMAs in regulatory tasks and their assumption of the
duty of collective bargaining is a complex one and it is
hard to indicate a coherent pattern between them. We
believe that this issue deserves further exploration be-
yond the scope of this paper.
It is interesting to dwell for a moment on the similarities
and differences between the UK and Germany regarding
the relationship between the government and the profes-
sion. In both cases we see that physicians have a certain
amount of autonomy, but this autonomy was achieved,
and is currently regulated, differently in the two countries.
The British model was shaped through efforts of doctors
to preserve their autonomy and stave off government
regulation. This is evident in the continuing struggle be-
tween physicians and the government for dominance over
the GMC. In Germany, too, we see a system of self-
regulation, but one with characteristics different from
those in Britain, one that sports closer collaboration with
the government through broad powers on the part of the
medical chambers in the various districts. These chambers
tend to intervene in the professional life of the doctor and
instituted a detailed system of ethical and professional
codes, some of which are included in federal statutes [18].
Whereas self-regulation in Germany means wide-
spread collaboration between the doctors and the
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regulation in Britain was used as a strategy to create a
separate world of governance, closed to the wider audi-
ence of the government or the free market. The contrast
between the British and the German systems, according
to Moran, can be seen in the characteristics of the
GMC. The GMC plays a minor role in the health system
when it comes to financing and provision of services,
and has a narrow self-definition regarding its institu-
tional functions, and consequently, its resources are
similarly modest. As a result one can say that the “social
contract” between the government and the profession in
Germany has greater importance, even legally, than it
does in Britain [18].
From this point of view it is possible to gain perspec-
tive on the influence of economic, political and bureau-
cratic circumstances on the division of labor between
NMAs and the government through institutional
arrangements shaped and developed throughout history.
What about Israel?
Israel is absent from many of the different typologies
conducted in the field of health policy over the years. It
is difficult to assign a specific paradigm to the country.
Those who would assign it a corporatist model point to
the organization of the health system as one based on
insurance coverage by the sick funds. Those who see it
as more of a state system point to the National Health
Insurance Law, with its universal character and govern-
ment regulation of health services. Finally, the steady
rise in private expenditures on health, which is one of
the highest among OECD countries, brings it closer to a
market system, although at this stage this is not the
dominant mode of governance.
Nonetheless, when it comes to responsibility for regula-
tory mechanisms, we see a great similarity between Israel
and the Netherlands. Along with Germany, responsibility
is divided in all three countries between the government
and the NMA. Over the years, this model became fixed as
the natural and almost self-evident working model in
Israel, although from time to time disagreements would
(and still do) arise between the two bodies as to existing
boundaries. However, when studying the different inter-
national models, it is not at all self-evident why Israel is so
similar to those countries based on a corporatist model.
Why did Israel not develop a body such as the British
GMC, or independent or semi-independent agencies such
as in the American model? After all, both the UK and the
US always had and continue to have great influence on
the political and economic systems in Israel. In order to
begin to shed some light on this question, we must under-
stand the roots of the Israeli health care system, as well as
how the regulatory model developed to that which is fa-
miliar to us today.The Israeli health care system began developing many
years before the founding of the State, and therefore the
associations that sprung forth from the medical commu-
nity preceded national institutions in shaping its character.
Already at the start of the twentieth century, thousands of
immigrants were treated by a small group of physicians,
themselves immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe.
In 1909, these physicians numbered a mere 27, and were
not connected to any political party or stream [46]. They
performed their work individually, rather than as part of
organizations or medical institutions. However, this pat-
tern of individual care did not last long, and beginning in
1911 a number of “sick funds” were established. These
provided members with basic health services, both pri-
mary care and hospitalization, for a fixed membership fee,
and served as an early model of the corporatist system.
The Israeli Medical Association (then known as Hebrew
Medicinal Society for Jaffa and the Jaffa District, later as
The Hebrew Medical Association in the Land of Israel)
was founded shortly thereafter, in 1912.f
In May 1948, the State of Israel was established and
with it, the Ministry of Health, which inherited an
already existing and operating health care system. Dur-
ing these years, the medical profession operated under a
collectivist and hegemonic model that characterized the
first few decades of the State. This model of “building
the nation” was first and foremost characterized by hav-
ing the State as the central source of authority in the es-
tablishment of dominant social institutions.
In the context of this hegemonic model, professional
groups, among them physicians, did not attain signifi-
cant social power [47].g
Against this backdrop of historical, political and social
circumstances, the IMA’s request to be considered a
chamber was rejected. Even before the ink dried on the
Israeli Declaration of Independence, on June 1, 1948, the
IMA’s Central Committee sent a memorandum to the
Minister of Justice requesting status as a chamber, mean-
ing that all doctors would be statutorily required to have
membership in the Association. As previously noted, the
idea of a chamber is not an Israeli invention. German
doctors are members of chambers, and this arrangement
is the norm in other European countries as well. The de-
fining characteristic of chambers is their statutory author-
ity; similarly, the IMA wanted all doctors to join its rank
by law, and the organization, in turn, would maintain high
standards of medical and professional ethics, grant and
suspend, where necessary, medical licenses, and grant spe-
cialty certification. The government, however, rejected the
IMA’s application and did not grant the hoped for monop-
oly [48]. The result was that from then until today the
IMA has no real enforcement power or licensing authority
over its members. The initial vision of nationalism that
reigned in the early years of the State pushed aside the
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tion of the health system and sought to concentrate au-
thority in the hands of government institutions.
In this context, it is interesting to compare Israel and
Germany, since a similar process occurred in both,
with opposite outcomes. In 1874, three years after the
German states were combined into the German Empire,
the medical associations approached the governing bod-
ies of the fledgling Empire with a request to establish
chambers, membership in which would be mandatory
according to federal law. Such chambers already existed
in several states before the unification, including Baden,
Bavaria and Saxonia, but the doctors sought official rec-
ognition from the Empire. To their disappointment,
Chancellor Bismarck held that the Reich was not the ap-
propriate framework for establishing such regulation.
Despite the lack of federal legislation, in 1878 the pro-
fession organized a system of state level chambers as
mandatory physicians’ organizations alongside volun-
tary scientific associations. A similar process occurred
in most of the German states, which adopted such a
policy as a solution to the increasing need for profes-
sional discipline among physicians. Although ethical
codes existed in the scientific associations, membership
in the associations was voluntary and so subscription to
the codes could not be optimally guaranteed. The
doctors, for their part, saw the establishment of
chambers as a means of preventing unfair competition
by those practicing without a license [49]. In sum, the
German medical associations achieved and preserved
the standing of chambers, whereas the IMA did not.
This may explain the difference in the level of regula-
tory involvement between them. At the same time, a
similar explanation may serve to clarify the striking
similarity between IMA and the KNMG, both of which
operate in a hybrid-corporatist system while lacking the
formal standing of a chamber, leaving them with only
very limited regulatory authority.
Nonetheless, the government hegemony in Israel is
not complete. Control over residency and certification
was given to the Scientific Council, which is part of
IMA. In light of the events described heretofore, one
can ask why the governmental hegemony in the area of
medical regulation was never completed, and why
postgraduate training remained in the hands of the
profession.
There is no doubt that satisfactorily answering this
question requires in depth historical research; nonethe-
less, it may well be that the influence of German
immigrants played a part in this development, at least to
some degree. In 1936, the central scientific committee
for the organization of scientific lectures was established.
From these modest beginnings developed the Scientific
Council of the IMA, with its attendant broad set ofpowers [50]. This occurred at the height of the 5th wave
of Jewish immigration to Palestine from Central Europe,
known as the “German aliya” (immigration), which was
enormously significant in terms of its influence on
medicine in Israel. The Central European Jewish immi-
grant physicians brought about a true upheaval in the
area of medicine as a result of the vast differences in the
quality of medicine, the type of organization and the
professional values they brought with them, as
compared to earlier immigrants from Eastern Europe
[46].h From a numerical perspective, Germany was the
country of origin of the largest group of immigrant
physicians - 35% of the total number of physicians. Fur-
thermore, Germany was the country in which most
physicians (68%) at the time studied. By comparison,
the next country in terms of number of medical
students was Russia, in which only 19% of the immi-
grant doctors studied [51].
One of the major differences between the German-
Jewish immigrants and their older colleagues was the
former group’s tendency to specialize in specific fields of
medicine, as compared to their predecessors who tended
more to be general practitioners. The trend of special-
ization spread greatly as a result of the arrival of the
German-Jewish immigrants, and changed the face of
medicine in Israel, particularly in certain fields such as
surgery, X-rays and psychiatry [46]. It may be that the
scientific dominance of German-Jewish physicians, their
predilection for specialization and their attempts to as-
similate into the local system the organization and
working procedures to which they were accustomed in
their country of origin, partially contributed to the estab-
lishment of the Scientific Council under the auspices of
the IMA.i
The Scientific Council is responsible for the post-
graduate training and specialization of doctors by law.
Thus, in effect, the IMA did end up with some statutory
powers (those dealing with specialty certification), simi-
lar to the European medical associations, and especially
the KNMG.
It is interesting to note that, despite the current situ-
ation, retention of specialty certification by the profes-
sion is not self-evident. An attempt was made by the
government in 2009-2010 to move the Scientific Council
from the IMA’s jurisdiction to that of the Ministry of
Health. In response, the IMA launched a campaign
aimed at convincing government officials and members
of Knesset of the importance of leaving this responsibil-
ity in the hands of the profession. This campaign was
successful in thwarting such efforts at least to this point.
Conclusion
The regulation of the medical profession differs through-
out the world. In Continental Europe, co-operation
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mon. This kind of regulatory model reflects the corpor-
atist political-economic system historically rooted in
countries such as Germany, and at least to some extent
in the Netherlands. Conversely, in the US, where the pri-
vate sector is more prominent, the state consciously
distances itself from interference with the economy, and
simultaneously distances other bodies, including profes-
sional associations, from similar intervention.
Accordingly, the AMA does not itself assume regula-
tory functions, leaving these for independent non-
governmental bodies in the health care system. In the
UK, the BMA is defined as a trade union and the GMC
fills the regulatory missions delegated to it by the
government.
Considering the far-reaching American influence on
Israeli economy and politics and the long period of
British rule in Palestine, the current European-like
regulatory model in Israeli medicine is not self-evident.
As we have suggested, for historical and ideological
reasons, the Israeli health care system evolved initially
as a corporatist German-like model. With the estab-
lishment of the State of Israel, this model encountered
a strong social-political regime that aspired to impose
a statist regulatory approach and exclude professional
elites from holding powers of strategy, economy and
administration. This may explain the state’s refusal to
grant IMA the standing of a chamber, as opposed to
the standing of the German physician organizations. It
may also explain the striking similarity between IMA
and the KNMG – both organizations operate in a
hybrid-corporatist system while lacking the formal
standing of a chamber, leaving them with only limited
regulatory authority.
Finally, as we mentioned earlier, context and culture
are deciding factors in the development of health
systems. The Israeli case, as well as the others, illustrates
the potential roles of history and ideology in shaping
contemporary regulatory models. We would like to see
this issue further explored through historical and com-
parative research, with the hope of finding additional
explanations for the regulatory path that has evolved in
Israel.Endnotes
aIn certain countries, some form of recertification/reval-
idation is required after a fixed number of years. There are
wide differences in the recertification schemes. In some
cases doctors may be required to present a notice of ‘good
standing’, stating that no complaints have been issued
against them; in others, they must aver that they have
taken part in Continued Medical Education (CME) and/or
Continued Professional Development (CPD).bChambers are self-governing statutory bodies that
represent the interests of their members, monitor com-
pliance to professional standards and are responsible for
specialty training and continuing medical education.
However, the chamber does not actually grant or sus-
pend medical licenses.
cStudents from specific countries recognized by the
Ministry of Health are exempt from the licensing exam.
The Ministry is currently looking into expanding this list
of exemptions in order to combat the physician shortage.
dThe Fitness to Practice procedure is outlined in the
1983 Medical Act and the Fitness to Practice Rules of
2004.
eOn one hand, the BMA and the AMA are similar in
their lack of participation in regulatory activity. On the
other hand, the BMA differs distinctly from the AMA,
in that it is also a trade union. In that respect the BMA
somewhat resembles its European counterparts, repre-
senting its members in collective bargaining and negoti-
ating wages and work conditions (although in Germany,
the chambers generally do not engage in collective
bargaining themselves, but concentrate on their regula-
tory missions, leaving wage bargaining in the hands of
other corporatist bodies - the regional statutory health
insurance physician associations) [20].
fFurther historical background can be found in
Appendix.
gThis observation nonetheless raises an interesting ques-
tion, namely: how is it that the Israeli Bar Association
(IBA) managed to secure such broad autonomy for its
members? The Israeli Bar Association Law was first
enacted in 1961 and took effect in 1962, 18 years after the
first draft and 14 years after the establishment of the State,
and following countless obstacles and reservations. It is a
precedent setting law and the first of its kind in Israel.
According to Dr. Yehoshua Rottenstreich, the first chair-
man of the IBA, the law was the result of a political coup,
good connections and no small amount of luck. Support
for the Bar Association Law among Knesset members was
achieved in exchange for legal assistance with the defeat of
a different bill, The Inheritance Law, which did not sit well
with many of the members [52]. One can say that the es-
tablishment of the IBA as an independent statutory entity
was achieved in spite of the government’s position, and
not because of it, and in any event does not represent the
general approach of the time towards groups perceived as
“social elitists”.
hNote that despite the name given to this aliya,
immigrants from Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia
represented only one fourth of all immigrants between
the years 1933-1939, and numbered between 50,000-
60,000 persons [53].
iNonetheless, we must not exaggerate the power of
their immediate impact, keeping in mind that German-
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completely different geographical and cultural region,
struggling against difficult conditions. Many of them
weren’t employed at first, as the market was flooded
with specialists in a very short period of time [54].
Appendix -Historical background to the
development of medicine in Israel
In 1909, there were only 27 physicians in what was then
Palestine, and these were not connected to any political
party, organizations or institutions, but rather performed
their work individually. In 1911, the Workers Health Fund
Kupat Holim Clalit (today the Clalit Health Services) was
founded, and the Israeli Medical Association (then known
as Hebrew Medicinal Society for Jaffa and the Jaffa District,
later as The Hebrew Medical Association in the Land of
Israel) was founded shortly thereafter, in 1912. Between the
years 1911-1915 a number of sick funds were established
in Palestine by socialist-imbued Jewish pioneers working as
day laborers in Jewish agricultural settlements. The funds
provided members with basic health services, both primary
care and hospitalization, for a fixed membership fee. In
1921 the sick funds amalgamated and began operating
under the auspices of the Jewish Labour Federation
(Histadruth), a trade union framework founded a year earl-
ier, in 1920. Kupat Holim became a Labour Federation-
owned entity, controlled and operated under Labour
Federation management, and designed to serve the health
needs of trade union members and their families [55].
The collective organization of the health system at the
turn of the century expressed not only the immediate need
for health services, in light of serious diseases such as mal-
aria, but also the ideology of the socialist pioneers that
rejected any professional model that was not collective. In
this way, common ground was found between the object-
ive needs and the socialist world view of the Zionist estab-
lishment in the Jewish community in Palestine during the
British rule. The health system in the Palestine Jewish
community of the 1920's was built from scratch by two
organizations: one philanthropic, the American Zionist
Women Organization "Hadassah", and the second volun-
tary, Kupat Holim. Most of the immigrant physicians were
absorbed by these two organizations and employed under
collective work agreements, largely preempting the need
for the establishment of a private medical infrastructure
[46,56].
Clearly, the evolving health care system of the Jewish
community in Palestine took the form of a corporatist
model at that stage, providing essential medical services
and fulfilling the collective vision of the pioneers. This
to some extent explains the difference between the regu-
latory model in Israel and that in the US. It also sheds
light on the difference between the Israeli model and its
British counterpart, despite the lengthy period of theBritish rule in Israel and its wide influence on the Israeli
legal system.
In May 1948, the State of Israel was established and the
newly formed Ministry of Health inherited an already
existing and operating health care system. During these
years, the medical profession operated under a collectivist
and hegemonic model that characterized the first few
decades of the State. This model of "building the nation"
was first and foremost characterized by having the State as
the central source of authority in the establishment of
dominant social institutions. The economic, medical, legal
and military systems and even the individual saw them-
selves as recruits of the national, collective goals and were
subordinate to them [47]. Then Prime Minister David Ben
Gurion tried to impose a governmental model, success-
fully implemented in the military and educational systems,
on the already operating health system, but this idea was
rejected by the Histadruth Labor Union, which held great
political power In point of fact, health insurance coverage
remained in the hands of public, non-governmental
institutions, due to a series of differences that arose over
the years between the Ministry of Health and the Clalit
sick fund [57].
Competing interests
The authors declare they have no competing interests.
Authors’ contribution
The authors jointly conceived of the concept and design of the paper. MG
focused primarily on data collection and drafting the empirical sections of
the paper. BL focused primarily on the methodological, historical and
theoretical sections of the paper. MB was primarily responsible for data
integration and editing. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Authors’ information
Malke Borow is the director of the Division of Law and Policy at the Israeli
Medical Association, which covers the fields of law, health policy and
international relations. She holds a BA in psychology from Queens College/
CUNY and a JD from Columbia University in New York.
Baruch Levi is a researcher of health policy at the Israeli Medical Association.
He holds a BA in Economics and International Relations from the Hebrew
University in Jerusalem, an MA in Political Science from Tel Aviv University
and is currently working on his PhD about the effects of economic policies
on public health.
Michelle Glekin is an International Relations Officer at the Israeli Medical
Association. She holds an MA in psychology from the University of
Edinburgh.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to acknowledge the assistance of and thank
Dr. Leonid Eidelman, IMA President, Adv. Leah Wapner, IMA Secretary
General and Dr. Udi Cantor, Director of the Division of Medical Policy, IMA,
for their invaluable support and guidance with this work. Thank you also to
Prof. Shifra Shvartz, Dr. Bruce Rosen and the anonymous reviewers for their
valuable comments.
Received: 4 July 2012 Accepted: 5 February 2013
Published: 20 February 2013
References
1. The American Medical Association website. http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/
pub/ama-president-blog/road-dr-carmel.page?plckController =
Blog&plckBlogPage = BlogViewPost&UID = 967c531f-d6a6-4756-908e-
70b00c4946e8&plckPostId = Blog%3a967c531f-d6a6-4756-908e-
Borow et al. Israel Journal of Health Policy Research 2013, 2:8 Page 19 of 19
http://www.ijhpr.org/content/2/1/870b00c4946e8Post%3a49e0e1cb-37f0-4d2c-9d3e-3a58c0115599&plckScript
= blogScript&plckElementId = blogDest.
2. Levi-Faur D: Regulation and Regulatory Governance – Working Paper.
Jerusalem Papers in Regulation and Governance. Mount Scopus, Jerusalem,
Israel: The Hebrew University; 2010.
3. OECD: Reducing the Risk of Policy Failure: Challenges for Regulatory
Compliance. 2000.
4. Gaffikin M: Regulation as Accounting Theory. Wollongong, Australia:
University of Wollongong, Faculty of Commerce Working Papers; 2005.
5. Cruess SR, Cruess RL: The medical profession and self-regulation: a
current challenge. Virtual Mentor 2005, 7(4). http://virtualmentor.ama-assn.
org/2005/04/oped1-0504.html.
6. Blackmer J: WMA White paper - Professionalism and the medical association.
Ferney-Voltaire, France: World Medical Association; 2007.
7. Bartle I, Vass P: Self-Regulation and the Regulatory State – A Survey of Policy
and Practice. Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries (CRI). 2005.
8. Stacey M: The case for and against medical self-regulation. Federation
Bulletin 1997, 84(1):17–25.
9. Saltman RB: Context, culture and the practical limits of health sector
accountability. In Improving Health and Health Care: Who is responsible?
Who is accountable? Edited by Rosen B, Israeli A, Shortell S. 2010:35–50.
10. Companje KP, Hendriks RHM, Veraghtert KFE, Widdershoven BEM: Two
Centuries of Solidarity – German, Belgian and Dutch social health insurance
1770-2008. Amsterdam: Askant Academic Publishers; 2009.
11. Salter B: Change in the Governance of Medicine: The Politics of Self-
Regulation. In Regulating Doctors. Edited by Gladstone D. London: Institute
for the Study of Civil Society; 2000:8–27.
12. Burau V, Blank RH: Comparing health policy: An assessment of typologies
of health systems. J Comp Policy Anal 2006, 8(1):63–76.
13. Esping-Andersen G: The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge:
Princeton University Press; 1990.
14. Giaimo S, Manow P: Adapting the Welfare State: The Case of Health Care
Reform in Britain, Germany and the United States. Comp Polit Stud 1999,
32:967–1,000.
15. Bambra C: Worlds of welfare and the health care discrepancy. Soc Policy
Society 2005, 4(1):31–41.
16. Wendt C, Frisina L, Rothgang H: Healthcare System Types: A Conceptual
Framework for Comparison. Soc Policy Admin 2009, 43(1):70–90.
17. Wendt C: Mapping European healthcare systems: a comparative analysis
of financing, service provision and access to healthcare. J Eur Soc Policy
2009, 19:432–445.
18. Moran M: Governing the Health Care State: A Comparative Study of the United
Kingdom, the United States and Germany. Manchester: Manchester University
Press; 1999.
19. Moran M: Understanding the welfare state: the case of health care.
Br J Polit Int Relat 2000, 2:135–160.
20. World Health Organization: Health Care Systems in Transition - Germany.
Copenhagen, Denmark: European Observatory on Health Care Systems;
2000.
21. Esping-Andersen G: Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies. Oxford:
Oxford University Press; 1999.
22. Alan R, Garcia-Barbero M: Regulation and licensing of physicians in the WHO
European Region. Copenhagen, Denmark: WHO; 2005.
23. de Vries H, Sanderson P, Janta B, Rabinovich L, Archontakis F, Ismail S,
Klautzer L, Marjanovic S, Patruni B, Puri S, Tiessen J, Rand Europe:
International Comparison of Ten Medical Regulatory Systems. Santa Monica,
California: Rand Corporation; 2009.
24. Accreditation Council of Oncology in Europe: Continuing Medical Education
(CME) in Europe: A survey of the situation in the 27 EU Member States. 2009.
25. Israeli Ministry of Health website: Israeli Ministry of Health website. http://
www.health.gov.il/Subjects/MedicalAndHealthProfessions/Pages/default.aspx
(Hebrew).
26. The Royal Dutch Medical Association (KNMG) [website http://knmg.artsennet.
nl/Over-KNMG/About-KNMG.htm]
27. CIBG Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport (executive agency of the
Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport). [www.bigregister.nl/en].
28. Allsop J, Jones K: Final Report Quality Assurance in Medical Regulation in an
International Context. 2005.
29. UK Medical Act.1983.
30. The General Medical Council website. http://www.gmc-uk.org/about/
legislation/registration_legislation.asp.31. Federation of State Medical Board. State of the states physician regulation.
2009.
32. The Federation of state medical boards website. [www.fsmb.org/]
33. European Union of Medical Specialists (UEMS): Charter on Training of
Medical Specialists in the European Community. Brussels, Belgium; 1993.
34. Rosen B, Samuel H: Health Systems in Transition - Israel. Copenhagen,
Denmark: European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies; 2009.
35. Schafer W, Kroneman M, Boerma W, Van den Berg M, Westert G, Deville W,
Van Ginneken E: Health Systems in Transition - Netherlands. European
Observatory on Health Systems and Policies; 2010.
36. Royal Dutch Medical Association: A Letter to the Israeli Medical Association.
2011.
37. European Medical Association website. [www.emanet.org/pg-netherlands.cfm]
38. The British Medical Association website. [www.bma.org.uk]
39. The American Board of Medical Specialties website. [www.abms.org/
About_ABMS/]
40. The German Medical Association: A Letter to the Israeli Medical Association.
2011.
41. The British Medical Association: A Letter to the Israeli Medical Association.
2011.
42. American Medical Association: Code of Medical Ethics, Opinion 9.04 - Discipline
and Medicine. 1994.
43. Wallenburg I, Helderman JK, De Bont A, Scheele F: Negotiating Authority:
A comparative study of reforms in medical training regimes. J Health
Polit 2012, 37(3):439–467.
44. Gladstone D: Editor’s Introduction: Regulation, Accountability and Health
Care. In Regulating Doctors. Edited by Gladstone D. London: Institute for the
Study of Civil Society; 2000:28–39.
45. Stacy M: The General Medical Council and Professional Self-Regulation. In
Regulating Doctors. Edited by Gladstone D. London: Institute for the Study
of Civil Society; 2000:28–39.
46. Neederland D: The Influence of German Immigrant Doctors on the
Development of Medicine in Israel 1933-1948. Cathedra 1983, 30:111–160.
Hebrew.
47. Canyon S, Harrison M, Silber I: White Coat to White Collar: a Socio-
Historical Analysis of the Relations between the Medical Profession and
the Court, as Reflected in Medical Liability Rulings. Med Law 2006,
34:52–72. Hebrew.
48. Yishai Y: The power of specialization - The Israeli Medical Association.
Jerusalem: the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies; 1990. Hebrew.
49. McClelland CE: The German Experience of Professionalization. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press; 1991.
50. The Israeli Medical Association website. http://www.ima.org.il/MainSite/
ViewCategory.aspx?categoryId =139 (Hebrew).
51. Gelber Y: A New Homeland - The Immigration from Central Europe and its
Absorption in Eretz Israel 1933-1948. Jerusalem: Leo Baeck Institute and Yad
Izhak Ben-Zvi; 1990 (Hebrew).
52. Israel Bar Association: Orech Hadin-the journal of the Israel Bar Association,
Jubilee Edition 1961-2011 (Hebrew).
53. Stenkwich R: The Fifth Aliya 1931-1939 (Hebrew). [http://www.irgun-jeckes.
org/?CategoryID = 181&ArticleID = 578]
54. Shvarts S, De Leeuw D, Granit S, Benbassat J: From socialist principles to
motorcycle Maintenance: The origin and development of the salaried
physician model in the Israeli public health services, 1918 to 1998.
Am J Pub Health 1999 1918, 89(2):248–253.
55. Shvarts S: Health reform in Israel - some aspects of seventy years of
struggle (1925-1995). Soc History Med 1998, 11(1):73–88.
56. Levy N: History of Medicine in the Holy Land 1799-1948. Haifa: Hakibbutz
Hameuchad Publishing House & the Bruce Rappaport Faculty of Medicine,
Technion, Haifa, Israel; 1998. Hebrew.
57. Shvarts S, Golan O, Kaplan G: Equal or More Equal than Others - Key
Aspects of the Development of the Concept of Equality in Health
Services in the Jewish Community of Pre-state Israel. Med Law 2011,
44:10–25. Hebrew.
doi:10.1186/2045-4015-2-8
Cite this article as: Borow et al.: Regulatory tasks of national medical
associations - international comparison and the Israeli case. Israel Journal
of Health Policy Research 2013 2:8.
